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Costs in Child Custody Actions and the
Question of Dischargeability
Angela Rohman Russot
Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that debts
to a spouse, former spouse, or child in connection with the sup-
port of a child are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.1 Support in-
cludes all "genuine support obligations."2 The circuits have split
on whether costs incurred in a child custody action, such as at-
torney or guardian ad litem fees, qualify as support.
The Fifth Circuit has taken the majority position, finding
that costs incurred in child custody disputes are not discharge-
able in bankruptcy. In Dvorak v Carlson,3 the court held that
court-ordered attorney and guardian ad litem fees incurred dur-
ing custody litigation did constitute child support because cus-
tody hearings are inherently for the benefit and support of the
child.4 Thus, the court found that such debts are not discharge-
able during bankruptcy.' The Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits also have found that debts for costs awarded in child cus-
tody actions were not dischargeable.6
Only one circuit has held that debts incurred in child cus-
tody disputes are dischargeable in bankruptcy. In Adams v
Zentz,7 the Eighth Circuit held that a debt from a custody dispute
was not "in the nature of support."' Thus, the debt was dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy, where the proceeding focused on the
t A.B. 2001, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Chicago.
1 See 11 USC § 523(a)(5) (2000).
2 Shine v Shine, 802 F2d 583, 588 (1st Cir 1986).
3 986 F2d 940 (5th Cir 1993).
4 Id at 941 (noting that custody hearings are "clearly" for the child's support as "the
purpose of the hearing [is] to determine who could provide the best home" for the child).
5 Id at 942.
6 See Strickland v Shannon, 90 F3d 444 (11th Cir 1996); Jones v Jones, 9 F3d 878
(10th Cir 1993); In re Peters, 964 F2d 166 (2d Cir 1992).
7 963 F2d 197 (8th Cir 1992).
8 Id at 200.
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welfare of the parent being denied contact with the child, rather
than on the child herself.9
The reasoning of the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits
can be reconciled on some level with that in Adams. One can ar-
gue, for example, that in each case the court of appeals accepted
the bankruptcy court's determination and adopted the approach
to discharge that would allow them to uphold it. The Fifth Cir-
cuit in Dvorak based its holding entirely on the supposition that
the custody proceeding ultimately provides support for the child,
effectively making all costs incurred in child custody disputes
nondischargeable in bankruptcy." The decision, however, can be
read-just as Adams can be read-as driven by the bankruptcy
court's initial determination of whether the debts at issue were
in the nature of support.
This attempt at reconciliation, however, fails when applied
to the position of the Tenth Circuit. While the Fifth Circuit sees
the question as one of mixed law and fact, the Tenth Circuit
treated the question as solely one of law. Thus, the Tenth Circuit
found that costs incurred in child custody disputes were not dis-
chargeable as a matter of law.1 The fact-intensive inquiry of Ad-
ams stands in direct opposition to this position, which would
limit the bankruptcy court's discretion to overturn family court
awards for costs in custody actions to those situations in which
the bankruptcy court finds "unusual circumstances.""
This Comment argues in favor of the position adopted by the
Tenth Circuit: debts that consist of costs awarded in custody and
visitation disputes should be nondischargeable as a matter of
law. As a matter of law, costs awarded in custody actions should
constitute support for two reasons. First, bankruptcy courts do
not have the institutional capacity to determine what is in the
best interests of children. Second, allowing dischargeability in
the child custody context would improperly interfere with the
province of the state courts.
Deference by the bankruptcy courts to awards in child cus-
tody disputes properly reflects the relative institutional capaci-
ties of both bankruptcy and family courts. Family courts are bet-
9 Id at 200-01.
10 See Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941.
11 Jones, 9 F3d 878.
12 Id at 882 (Therefore, in order that genuine support obligations are not improperly
discharged, we hold that the term 'support' encompasses the issue of custody absent un-
usual circumstances not present here.").
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ter suited than bankruptcy courts to make the fact-intensive in-
quiry into subjective motivations in custody cases to determine
what is necessary for support. 3 Furthermore, because family
courts award costs under the best interests of the child standard,
allowing the bankruptcy courts to make factual determinations
of whether costs constitute support would result in the discharge
of some costs and fees awarded for the benefit of a child. When
state courts make awards for costs in child custody disputes,
they base these awards on whether making the award would
serve the child's best interests. Costs awarded under such a
standard are, by their nature, support. Thus, the discharge of
awards for costs in child custody disputes is a discharge of genu-
ine support obligations, in contravention of congressional policy. 4
The discharge of debts for costs awarded in child custody ac-
tions would improperly interfere with the province of the state
courts. Family law has a unique place in the federal system: it is
held up as the mainstay of exclusive localism. 5 In the bank-
ruptcy context, the position that federal courts should not inter-
fere with the states in matters of federal law has much merit
both on a policy level and an historical level. On a policy level,
bankruptcy courts lack the institutional capacity to handle de-
terminations of support in contentious child custody actions. 6 On
an historical level, under the common law understanding of
bankruptcy law that prevailed before the adoption of Section
523(a)(5), familial support obligations were not dischargeable in
bankruptcy. 7
Part I of this Comment gives background on Section
523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, discharge rules, and the cur-
rent split among the circuits over whether costs incurred in cus-
tody disputes constitute nondischargeable debts in bankruptcy.
Part II demonstrates that even if the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Adams can be reconciled with the majority position, the circuits
remain split as to whether costs from child custody actions con-
13 Id at 881.
14 Consider Shine, 802 F2d at 588.
15 Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L Rev
1297, 1298 (1998) (summarizing the arguments for a special status of exclusive localism
in family law).
16 Jones, 9 F3d at 881-82 (arguing that the bankruptcy courts are ill-equipped to
determine what constitutes support in a particular custody dispute).
17 Peter C. Alexander, Divorce and the Dischargeability of Debts: Focusing on Women
as Creditors in Bankruptcy, 43 Cath U L Rev 351, 356 (1994) (describing the "trend in
common law whereby state courts denied debtors the right to discharge alimony debts").
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stitute support as a matter of law. Part III argues that the ques-
tion of dischargeability should be addressed as a matter of law.
Part IV argues that congressional policy and institutional capac-
ity favor the conclusion that costs incurred in child custody ac-
tions are not dischargeable in bankruptcy as a matter of law, and
that allowing bankruptcy courts to make the fact-intensive Ad-
ams inquiry improperly intrudes on the province of the state
courts.
I. SECTION 523(A)(5) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE,
DISCHARGEABILITY, AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Background on Dischargeability and Section 523(a)(5)
In bankruptcy, an "honest but unfortunate debtor" relieves
himself of his indebtedness by surrendering his property for dis-
tribution and having his debts discharged by the bankruptcy
courts." Discharge provides the mechanism by which the debtor
receives a fresh start. 9 To facilitate the fresh start, courts have
construed narrowly the statutory exceptions to the general rule
of discharge.2 ° The law limits exception to discharge to those
categories of debts for which "Congress evidently concluded that
the creditors' interest in recovering full repayment of debts...
outweighed the debtors' interest in a complete fresh start."21
Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code lists the exceptions to
the rule of discharge of pre-bankruptcy debts," including certain
family obligations.2 Section 523(a)(5) identifies as nondischarge-
able those debts owed "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such
spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, di-
vorce decree or other order of a court of record."24 This exception
only applies to those obligations "actually in the nature of ali-
mony, maintenance, or support."25
Although this language might seem to limit the debts that
fall under the Section 523(a)(5) exception, courts have, contrary
18 Local Loan Co v Hunt, 292 US 234, 244 (1934).
19 Id at 244-45.
20 See Grogan v Garner, 498 US 279 (1991).
21 Id at 287.
22 See 11 USC § 523 (2000).
23 See id at § 523(a)(5).
24 Id.
25 See id at § 523(a)(5)(B).
596 [2004:
COSTS IN CHILD CUSTODYACTIONS
to their usual policy, construed the statutory language broadly in
keeping with "[clongressional policy ... to ensure that genuine
support obligations would not be discharged."26 Under Section
523(a)(5), therefore, debts for legal fees undertaken on behalf of a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor can be nondis-
chargeable, even though Section 523(a)(5) provides that debts
assigned to parties other than the spouse, former spouse, or child
of the debtor are dischargeable. 7
B. Background on the Circuit Split
The circuits have split as to whether costs in child custody
actions properly qualify as genuine support obligations that can-
not be discharged under Section 523(a)(5). One circuit has held
that such costs are not support;' four other have found them to
be support obligations.29 These four circuits, however, do not ap-
ply a consistent standard of review; instead, they disagree over
whether the dischargeability of costs incurred in child custody
disputes should be analyzed as a question of law or as a mixed
question of fact and law.
1. Costs incurred in child custody disputes constitute
support.
The four circuits determining that debts for costs from child
custody actions are not dischargeable in bankruptcy have
adopted one of two theories. The Fifth Circuit has held that debts
for costs necessary to the child custody dispute are nondis-
chargeable simply "[blecause the ultimate purpose of such a pro-
ceeding is to provide support for the child."' Alternately, the
26 See, for example, Shine v Shine, 802 F2d 583, 588 (1st Cir 1986).
27 See Pauley v Spong, 661 F2d 6, 10 (2d Cir 1981) ("We view appellee's undertaking
to pay his wife's legal fees as a pragmatic third party beneficiary contract, which is not,
and should not be confused with, an assignment.").
28 The Eighth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's discharge of attorney's fees from
a child custody proceeding in Adams, 986 F2d at 940.
29 See Strickland v Shannon, 90 F3d 444 (11th Cir 1996); Dvorak, 986 F2d at 940;
Jones v Jones, 9 F3d 878 (10th Cir 1993); In re Peters, 964 F2d 166 (2d Cir 1992).
30 See Falk & Siemer v Maddigan, 312 F3d 589, 593-94 (2d Cir 2002) (collapsing its
determination of legal and factual conclusions by the bankruptcy court); Strickland, 90
F3d at 446-47 (reviewing the issue as a matter of law, but deciding the issue narrowly so
as to allow departures under different factual circumstances); Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941
(reviewing the issue as a matter of law); Jones, 9 F3d at 882 (holding that costs awarded
in custody actions are deemed to be support as a matter of law).
31 Hudson v Raggio & Raggio, Inc, 107 F3d 355, 357 (5th Cir 1997).
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Second, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that such debts
are presumed to be support under Section 523(a)(5), but that
special circumstances might indicate otherwise.32
The Fifth Circuit has decided on public policy grounds that
because child custody and support are inexorably connected,
costs from child custody actions are debts in the nature of sup-
port.33 In Dvorak, the Fifth Circuit held that debts for fees in-
curred and awarded in child custody actions are nondischarge-
able in bankruptcy, because such actions are categorically for the
benefit and support of the child.34 The court reasoned that child
custody hearings are "clearly for ... [the child's] benefit and sup-
port" because their purpose is "to determine who could provide
the best home" for the child.35 That is, because of the purpose of
the resolution of child custody disputes, the associated costs con-
stitute a form of support. Once the court in Dvorak made a cate-
gorical determination that the custody proceedings "[were]
clearly for [the child's] benefit and support," it neither inquired
whether any ulterior motive existed nor made any further in-
quiry into whether the costs associated with the action consti-
tuted support." The court defined the ultimate purpose of the
underlying action objectively with respect to the nature of the
proceeding, and then utilized that objective purpose to control
the decision as to dischargeability. 7
In Hudson v Raggio & Raggio, Inc,38 the Fifth Circuit rea-
soned that attorney's fees incurred in a child custody dispute
could not be discharged in bankruptcy "[b]ecause the ultimate
purpose of such a [custody] proceeding is to provide support for
the child."39 Just as in Dvorak, the court looked to the nature of
the proceeding to determine whether the costs constituted sup-
32 See Strickland, 90 F3d at 447 (holding that when an award of costs in a child cus-
tody action derives from a party's relative ability to pay, such an award constitutes sup-
port in the absence of unusual circumstances); Jones, 9 F3d at 881 (holding that costs
awarded in child custody disputes constitute support "in the absence of clear indication of
special circumstances to the contrary"); Peters v Hennenhoeffer, 133 BR 291, 296 (S D NY
1991) (questioning whether any facts warrant an exception to a rule classifying custody
actions as in the nature of support).
33 See Hudson, 107 F3d at 357 (reasoning that the services for which the costs were
incurred cannot be separated from support).
34 Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941.
35 Id.
36 Id (analyzing the issue of dischargeability objectively in terms of whether the un-
derlying action is for the support of the child).
37 Id.
38 107 F3d 355 (5th Cir 1997).
39 Id at 357.
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port." In both cases, the courts reasoned that custody actions are
for a child's benefit and support, because determining the best
home for a child is part of support.41 On this basis, the court in
Hudson concluded that the costs associated with the child sup-
port action fell within the exception to dischargeability in Section
523(a)(5)."
The objective analysis underlying the holdings in Dvorak
and Hudson is consistent with treatment of the dischargeability
issue as one of law. The Fifth Circuit, however, characterized the
question as one of both fact and law, even as it made a narrow
decision of law.43 Furthermore, it qualified its holding in Hudson
with the statement that its analysis depended on a proper de-
termination by the bankruptcy court that the fees at issue were
"necessary to provide support for the child." 4
The Second Circuit adopted an objective analysis similar to
that in Dvorak, but carved out an exception for unusual circum-
stances in its analysis. In Peters v Hennenhoeffer,45 the circuit
court upheld the district court's determination that an award for
attorney's fees owed for representation of the debtor's son was in
the nature of support, and thus was not dischargeable under Sec-
tion 523(a)(5).46 The court based its decision on public policy
grounds, arguing that the discharge of such debts generally
would impair the ability of parents to bring or defend custody
actions in the best interests of their children.47 Although the Sec-
ond Circuit in Peters did not explicitly carve out an unusual cir-
cumstances exception, it did substantially adopt the district
court's reasoning that incorporated this exception. 8 Further-
40 See Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941.
41 Id.
42 See Hudson, 107 F3d at 357 ("Because the ultimate purpose of such a proceeding is
to provide support for the child, the attorneys fees incurred inure to her benefit and sup-
port, and therefore fall under the exception to dischargeability set out in § 523(a)(5).");
Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941 (reasoning that the fees fall under the discharge exception when
they are incurred during proceedings that are in the nature of support).
43 Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941 ("We review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous
standard, but are free to review conclusions of law de novo.").
44 Hudson, 107 F3d at 357.
45 964 F2d 166 (2d Cir 1992).
46 Peters, 133 BR at 297.
47 See Peters, 964 F2d at 167, quoting Spong, 661 F2d at 9 ("An award of attorney's
fees may be essential to . . . [the] ability to sue or defend a [support] action and thus a
necessary under the law .... [D]ischargeability must be determined by the substance of
the liability rather than its form.").
48 Peters, 133 BR at 296 ("We must consider whether there are any facts here war-
ranting an exception to this rule [of the custody dispute being classified as in the nature
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more, the Second Circuit explicitly approved this exception ten
years later in Falk & Siemer, LLP v Maddigan.4"
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit did not clarify
whether each of its determinations should be reviewed as a ques-
tion of law or fact." The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, on the
other hand, approach the issue as a question of law.5' In doing so,
the two circuits explicitly carve out an exception for unusual cir-
cumstances in their analyses while holding that costs incurred
and awarded in custody actions are nondischargeable as support
obligations because such actions are for the benefit and support
of the child. 2
The Tenth Circuit in Jones v Jones," like the Fifth Circuit in
Dvorak, looked to the nature of the custody action to determine
whether such actions generally are necessary to the support of
the child. 4 It relied on the ultimate goal of the proceeding to a
greater extent than the Fifth Circuit did, finding that the ulti-
mate purpose of a child custody proceeding is controlling because
the best interest of the child standard is synonymous with a de-
termination of support." The court reasoned that "in all custody
actions, the court's ultimate goal is the welfare of the child," and
the best interest of the child is "an inseparable element" of sup-
port. 6 However, unlike in Dvorak, the court qualified its holding,
reserving the issue of whether a custody proceeding automati-
cally constitutes "support" in the presence of "unusual circum-
stances," without defining what those circumstances might be. 7
Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Strickland v Shannon,'5 held
that "an attorney fees award arising from a post-dissolution cus-
tody action constitutes 'support' for the former spouse" when the
of support].").
49 312 F3d 589, 594 (2d Cir 2002).
50 See Falk, 312 F3d at 593-94 (2d Cir 2002) (collapsing its determination of legal and
factual conclusions by the bankruptcy court in its application of the standard of review).
51 See Strickland, 90 F3d at 446; Miller v Gentry, 55 F3d 1487, 1489 (10th Cir 1995);
Jones, 9 F3d at 880.
52 See Strickland, 90 F3d at 446; Miller, 55 F3d at 1489; Jones, 9 F3d at 880.
53 9 F3d 878 (10th Cir 1993).
54 Id at 881 ("Since determination of child custody is essential to the child's proper
'support,' attorney fees incurred and awarded in child custody litigation should likewise
be considered as obligations for 'support,' at least in the absence of clear indication of
special circumstances to the contrary.").
55 Id at 882.
56 Id at 881.
57 Jones, 9 F3d at 882.
58 90 F3d 444 (l1th Cir 1996).
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award derived from the spouse's relative ability to pay, in the
absence of special circumstances.59 It affirmed the district court's
determination that the debt in question constituted support. °
The court found this appropriate "in the absence of special cir-
cumstances showing otherwise from the record in the underlying
proceedings.""'
The use of the term "unusual circumstances" in Jones, could
have two meanings. First, the phrase could refer to unusual facts
present in the underlying custody or visitation action. Second,
the phrase could refer to abuse of discretion or some other proce-
dural irregularity. If "unusual circumstances" refers to the facts
of the underlying custody action, then those circuits that carve
out unusual circumstances exceptions will, in effect, decide dis-
chargeability of costs awarded in child custody cases on a factual
case-by-case basis.
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned in Strickland that where one
parent receives an award for attorney's fees based on the parties'
comparative ability to pay, the debt created by that award con-
stitutes support for the purpose of Section 523(a)(5).62 In so rul-
ing, however, the court explicitly carved out an undefined excep-
tion for special circumstances that might indicate that the debt
should be discharged.63 The Second Circuit spelled out one possi-
ble definition for such special circumstances.' In Falk, the Sec-
ond Circuit relied on Peters and held that attorney's fees were
not dischargeable as they were incurred at least partially for the
benefit of the child.65 The court sought to limit its holding by em-
phasizing that in certain circumstances, costs incurred in cus-
tody actions do not constitute support. The court warned:
In reaching this conclusion, we do not suggest that a debt
for legal services incurred by a nonspouse parent as part
of custody proceedings is always for the benefit of a child
within the meaning of § 523(a)(5). It is possible that legal
59 Id at 447.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Strickland, 90 F3d at 447.
63 Id.
64 Falk, 312 F3d at 594.
65 Id.
593] 601
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
fees in a custody proceeding may be incurred solely for the
benefit of the interests of a parent."
Some bankruptcy courts have endorsed this reasoning. In In
re Ramirez" and Bower v Deickler," the district courts distin-
guished the Eighth Circuit's allocation of discretion to the bank-
ruptcy court over the dischargeability of costs from the holdings
of the majority of circuits that have found debts incurred for fees
in custody actions to be nondischargeable.69 Both courts found
the majority position persuasive, but carefully qualified their
holdings by reference to "circumstances" or "indications" which
might have made the instant cases come out the other way."
The unusual circumstances exception to the general rule
against discharge can also be read as referring to abuse of discre-
tion or another procedural irregularity. In holding that costs in-
curred in custody disputes constitute support "absent unusual
circumstances not present here," the Tenth Circuit created a
high standard for such circumstances.1 While using the same
language as other circuits that carved out such exceptions, the
Tenth Circuit made a strong institutional capacity argument
against allowing or forcing bankruptcy courts to determine the
"subjective motivations" of parents in a custody action.72 The
court stated in Jones that a state court has more ability than the
bankruptcy court to determine whether a parent's motive in
bringing a custody action is malicious and, furthermore, that
custody proceedings generally are "held for the child's benefit
and support" rather than for the parent's benefit.73 State courts'
greater experience with fleshing out malicious motives in custody
actions,4 together with their expertise in deciding the question of
66 Id.
67 2000 Bankr LEXIS 2019 (Bankr N D Ill).
68 1999 Bankr LEXIS 1877 (Bankr D NH).
69 Ramirez, 2000 Bankr LEXIS 2019, *11-15 (examining the circuit split and reject-
ing the position of the Eighth Circuit); Bower, 1999 Bankr LEXIS 1877, *6-9 (examining
the circuit split and finding the majority's position persuasive).
70 See Ramirez, 2000 Bankr LEXIS 2019, *14 ("This Court agrees... that the best
interests of the child is necessarily the key issue in all custody actions, and that fees
incurred in custody actions should be presumed to be in the nature of support unless
exceptional circumstances exist."); Bower, 1999 Bankr LEXIS 1877, *8-9 ("In the absence
of any indication to the contrary, the Court will find that the attorney's fees incurred...
in the child custody litigation should be considered support under section 523(a)(5).").
71 See Jones, 9F3d at 882.
72 Id at 881.
73 Id at 882.
74 Id at 881.
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support,5 make them better suited to decide whether costs con-
stitute support.
In Jones, the debtor's ex-husband claimed that she only at-
tempted to obtain custody in order to avoid paying child support.
The court deemed this argument insufficiently "unusual" to war-
rant a departure from the state court determination." That find-
ing, together with the court's institutional argument and its em-
phasis on the goal of custody proceedings, suggests that the "un-
usual circumstances" exception would not include a proceeding
brought for the interests of one parent, as the Second Circuit
suggested. Rather, only a procedural anomaly or an abuse of dis-
cretion by the state court would warrant a departure from the
award made. The court's broad statement that, "in all custody
actions, the court's ultimate goal is the welfare of the child," sup-
ports this view.77 This broad language regarding the underlying
goal of child custody actions generally is reminiscent of the un-
qualified approach to construing costs awarded in child custody
actions as support seen in Dvorak."8 If family courts only award
costs in support of the child, bankruptcy courts should only dis-
charge or uphold discharge of costs if there had been such an
abuse of discretion or other procedural irregularity.
2. The minority position of the Eighth Circuit.
In contrast to the other circuits, the Eighth Circuit in Adams
found that costs incurred in custody and visitation litigation
were dischargeable in bankruptcy.79 The court reasoned that in
determining "whether to characterize an award as maintenance
or support the crucial issue is the function the award was in-
tended to serve."" Because the Eighth Circuit characterized the
issue presented as a factual question for the bankruptcy court, it
upheld the bankruptcy court's finding that both parents were "fit
and adequate."8 The custody action in question benefited, and
took place in order to benefit, a father whose ex-wife's conduct
damaged his "ability to maintain a relationship with his daugh-
75 Jones, 9 F3d at 881.
76 Id at 882.
77 Id at 881.
78 See Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941.
79 Adams, 963 F2d at 199.
80 Id at 200 (internal quotation omitted).
81 Id.
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ter."2 Thus, the bankruptcy court reasoned that the action was
not for the child's benefit and support.3
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the findings of the bankruptcy
court for clear error. It determined that the question of dis-
chargeability presented issues of fact, rather than of law.84 The
approach of the Eighth Circuit differs from the majority of courts
in that it requires bankruptcy courts to make an independent
and fact-intensive inquiry into whether the child custody or visi-
tation proceedings were actually in the nature of support.8 5 Other
courts have criticized the Eighth Circuit's understanding of the
issue. 6 These courts have instead adopted the majority position,
and generally presume that custody proceedings are in the na-
ture of support as a matter of law, even where the presumption
is rebuttable."
Both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits found that a simple
legal inquiry was better suited to deciding the dischargeability
question than a fact-intensive inquiry. The Eleventh Circuit in-
terpreted the statutory language to require a simple inquiry:
"whether the obligation can legitimately be characterized as sup-
port, that is, whether it is in the nature of support."" The Tenth
Circuit instead focused on the general appropriateness of a bank-
ruptcy court making a fact-intensive inquiry in the custody con-
text. The court reasoned that such an inquiry "could require ex-
tensive hearings and fact-findings into the parties' subjective
82 Id.
83 Adams, 963 F2d at 201.
84 Compare id at 200 ("This is a question of fact to be decided by the bankruptcy
court.") with Strickland, 90 F3d at 446 ("The issue of whether the attorney fees award in
this case constituted 'support' within the meaning of§ 523(a)(5) is a matter of federal law,
which we review de novo.").
85 Adams, 963 F2d at 200-01. See also Ramirez, 2000 Bankr LEXIS 2019, *13-14
(stating that the Eighth Circuit 'implicitly approved of the bankruptcy court's inquiry
into the facts and circumstances of the custody proceeding to determine whether the
child's health, welfare and best interests were truly at issue in the proceeding").
86 See, for example, Werthen v Werthen, 282 BR 553 (BAP 1st Cir 2002), in which the
court first relied on Adams for the proposition that it must accept the bankruptcy court's
findings on whether an award constituted support unless those findings were clearly
erroneous, but then qualified that standard of review. Id. Citing Shine v Shine, 802 F2d
583, 588 (1st Cir 1986), the court in Werthen made clear that federal law, not state law,
controls factual findings, "and occasions will arise where a court is asked to determine
whether a given obligation is within the subsection's reach as a matter of law." Werthen,
282 BR at 556 n 4.
87 See Jones, 9 F3d at 881 ("[In all custody actions, the court's ultimate goal is the
welfare of the child.").
88 Strickland, 90 F3d at 446, citing In re Harrell, 754 F2d 902, 904-05 (11th Cir
1985).
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motivations which is more appropriate to the state court than a
bankruptcy court." 9 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that "in order
that genuine support obligations are not improperly discharged
. ..the term 'support' encompasses the issue of custody absent
unusual circumstances."90
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT SHOULD BE REFRAMED AS A SPLIT
BETWEEN CHARACTERIZING THE ISSUE AS ONE OF
LAW OR OF FACT
The Eighth Circuit's approach to the question of whether
debts incurred for fees awarded in custody and visitation litiga-
tion are dischargeable in bankruptcy can be reconciled with the
majority approach under one of three theories. First, it is possi-
ble to read Adams as embodying the fact-based unusual circum-
stances exception articulated by the Second Circuit in Falk."
Second, when examined closely, the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in
Adams is similar to the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Dvorak in
that both hinge on the underlying purpose of the custody action.92
Third, the differences between the position taken by the Eighth
Circuit in Adams and that taken by most other circuits stem
from each circuit's adoption of the approach to discharge that
would allow them to better defer to the factual determination
made by the bankruptcy court.93 Even so, the approach taken by
the Eighth Circuit stands in sharp contrast to that of the Tenth
Circuit, which has held that debts incurred for fees in custody
disputes are nondischargeable as a matter of law.94 This Part at-
tempts to reconcile Adams with the majority approach, but con-
cludes that a split remains as to whether this question should be
treated as a question of law or of fact.
A. Adams and the Falk Exception
The Second Circuit in Falk carved out an exception to its
holding that the award of costs constituted a nondischargeable
debt.9" If "legal fees in a custody proceeding . . . [are] incurred
89 Jones, 9 F3d at 881.
90 Id at 882.
91 Falk, 312 F3d at 594.
92 Compare Adams, 963 F2d at 200, with Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941.
93 Compare Adams, 963 F2d at 200, with Falk, 312 F3d at 592.
94 See Jones, 9 F3d at 882.
95 Falk, 312 F3d at 594.
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solely for the benefit of the interests of a parent," then they are
not for the benefit of the child under Section 523(a)(5).96 The de-
cision of the Eighth Circuit in Adams can be read as an example
of this exception.
In Adams, the court found that the costs "were a repercus-
sion of" the battle between the parents, specifically the debtor's
attempts to enforce custody rights against a wife determined to
frustrate them.97 In such a circumstance, costs ostensibly in-
curred in bringing and defending a custody action actually
served the parents' interests, and not the child's.98 Thus, the
Eighth Circuit reasoned, the debts for such costs did not fall un-
der the statutory exception and could be discharged in bank-
ruptcy.99
While this analysis generally reconciles the result in Adams
with the jurisprudence of the majority, the Eighth Circuit's own
reasoning contrasts more sharply with the majority. The main
difference between the approaches taken by the Second and the
Eighth Circuits stems from the question of whether the court
must make an independent evaluation of the subjective purpose
of the custody proceedings at issue.'00 The Second Circuit relies
on the decision of the state court and presumes that the costs of
proceedings constitute support, but allows litigants to rebut the
presumption.'0 ' The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, mandates
that bankruptcy courts make an independent evaluation based
on the record.' °
B. Similarity of Reasoning in Adams and Dvorak
In Adams, the Eighth Circuit held that dischargeability de-
pends on the function the state family court intended the award
96 Id.
97 Adams, 963 F3d at 199.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Compare Falk, 312 F3d at 595-96 (reviewing the objective evidence such as finan-
cial records cited by the bankruptcy court for its characterization of the underlying cus-
tody proceedings as in the nature of support, but failing to require an independent
evaluation of the function of every award), with Adams, 963 F2d at 199-200 (upholding
the independent factual inquiry made by the bankruptcy court into the motives of the
parties to the custody action as necessary to the determination of whether an award
constitutes support).
101 See Falk, 312 F3d at 594 (conceding that debts from costs can be unrelated to a
child's welfare).
102 Adams, 963 F2d at 200.
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of costs to serve."' The analysis in Adams turned on the court's
conclusion that the custody proceedings did not serve to benefit
and support the child.0 4 In Dvorak, on the other hand, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that custody hearings to determine the best
home for a child are categorically for her "benefit and support."
10
'
While the two circuits came to different conclusions, both evalu-
ated whether the custody proceedings were necessary for the
welfare of the child. Those courts that have excepted costs from
discharge determined that the proceeding was necessary for de-
termining the child's support.' 6 Conversely, the court in Adams
determined that the costs were unnecessarily incurred-and
thus did not constitute support-because the proceeding was not
for the child's welfare.' 7 Under either analysis, a court focuses
on the purpose of the child custody proceedings.
This attempt at reconciliation is open to the criticism that
the courts of appeals' deference to the factual findings of the
bankruptcy court may explain the differing results between Ad-
ams and Dvorak. The Eighth Circuit in Adams viewed the mat-
ter as purely a question of fact;' 8 for the Fifth Circuit, the ques-
tion embodied both fact and law.' 9 Deference to findings of fact
remains an incomplete explanation, however, in the face of the
differences in the courts' underlying understandings of the func-
tion of custody proceedings and the fees incurred in them. The
bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Illinois made this
point vividly. In rejecting the position taken by the Eighth Cir-
cuit, the bankruptcy court sharply criticized Adams:
[The Eighth Circuit's] approach ignores that the funda-
mental issue in every child custody proceeding is the best
interests of the child. Moreover, the Adams court's affir-
mance of a factual finding that a mother's extensive ef-
103 Id.
104 Id (citing numerous examples from the factual record in support of the bankruptcy
court's conclusion that the custody proceeding was a battle between the child's parents).
105 Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941.
106 Id.
107 Compare Peters v Hennenhoeffer, 133 BR 291, 295 (Bankr S DNY 1991) (holding
that "fees incurred on behalf of a child... are deemed to be support when those fees are
inextricably intertwined with proceedings affecting the welfare of a child"), with Adams,
963 F2d at 201 (holding that costs associated with custody and visitation proceedings
were dischargeable where the proceedings were not focused on the child's welfare).
108 Adams, 963 F2d at 200.
109 Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941 ("We review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous
standard, but are free to review conclusions of law de novo.") (citations omitted).
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forts to destroy a father's relationship with his child does
not affect the health, welfare, and best interests of the
child defies common sense."'
Whether or not the Eighth Circuit's deference to the decision
of the bankruptcy court "defies common sense," this criticism
reflects a fundamental difference in opinion about how courts
should evaluate the nature of child custody proceedings. Under
one view, the nature of custody proceedings shifts with the fac-
tual situation of each case. Under the competing view, the pur-
ported purpose of deciding the welfare and best interests of the
child necessarily determines the nature of all custody proceed-
ings. In both Adams and Dvorak, the courts looked to the nature
of custody proceedings and made a determination about the pro-
ceeding's relationship to "support."
C. Procedural Posture and the Circuit Split
Deference to the findings of the bankruptcy courts may ex-
plain the divergence in outcome between Adams and the other
cases in this area. In Adams, the Eighth Circuit upheld the
bankruptcy court's finding of dischargeability."' The court found
that whether a debt was in the nature of support was a factual
finding for the bankruptcy court, and must be upheld unless
clearly erroneous."' Because it could not find the bankruptcy
court's finding clearly erroneous, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, but
"acknowledge[d] that the record might plausibly be read to sup-
port a finding" of the debts as support."3 The holding in Adams
does not preclude a finding of support for costs incurred in child
custody disputes; it simply refuses to require them.
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Second and Fifth Circuits chose
to uphold the initial determinations of the bankruptcy courts
below."4 While the impact of findings of fact on the appellate
courts is unclear in these cases, deference to the findings of fact
of the lower court may partially explain each outcome. Both cir-
cuits upheld determinations of nondischargeability by bank-
110 Ramirez, 2000 Bankr LEXIS 2019, *14-15.
111 Adams, 963 F2d at 200.
112 Id.
113 Id at 201.
114 For examples of cases affirming bankruptcy and district courts' determinations
that the awards fit into the § 523(a)(5) exception to discharge, see Falk, 312 F3d at 592;
Hudson, 107 F3d at 356; Dvorak, 986 F2d at 940; Peters, 964 F2d at 167.
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ruptcy courts, and did not reach the question of whether bank-
ruptcy courts must, as a matter of law, find costs in custody ac-
tions nondischargeable. While the Second Circuit in Falk made it
clear that not all debts for awards of attorney's fees in custody
disputes would be nondischargeable,"' the Fifth Circuit did not
address this point. This silence permits two interpretations of its
holdings: broad support for the proposition that costs awarded in
child custody disputes should be deemed support, or narrow reli-
ance on the initial bankruptcy court's characterization.
Hudson highlighted this ambiguity by juxtaposing the broad
proposition that custody proceedings are in the nature of sup-
port ' with the assumption that the fees in question "were cor-
rectly characterized by the bankruptcy court as necessary to pro-
vide support for the child.""' 7 The determination that the bank-
ruptcy court's finding was correct as a matter of law merely im-
plies that such debts could fall under the exception to discharge-
ability, despite dicta which might go further.'
Even if the outcome in Hudson-and perhaps in Dvorak-
can be confined to situations where bankruptcy courts have
characterized costs in custody actions as support, the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decisions cannot be so reconciled. The Tenth Circuit in
Jones and Miller v Gentry"9 reversed denials of nondischargeabil-
ity by lower courts.'2' In Jones, the Tenth Circuit reversed the
bankruptcy court's finding that the debt for attorney's fees did
not fall within the exception under Section 523(a)(5).'2 ' The court
held that "the term 'support' encompasses the issue of custody
absent unusual circumstances not present here."2' In Miller, the
115 See Falk, 312 F3d at 594 ("In reaching this conclusion, we do not suggest that a
debt for legal services incurred by a nonspouse parent as part of custody proceedings is
always for the benefit of a child within the meaning of § 523(a)(5). It is possible that legal
fees in a custody proceeding may be incurred solely for the benefit of the interests of a
parent.").
116 Hudson, 107 F3d at 357 (reasoning that awards for attorney's fees in child support
actions are nondischargeable because "the ultimate purpose of such a proceeding is to
provide support for the child" and therefore "the attorney fees incurred inure to her bene-
fit and support") (citations omitted).
117 Id at 357.
118 Id ("A court ordered obligation to pay attorney fees charged by an attorney that
represents a child's parent in child support litigation is non-dischargeable.").
119 55 F3d 1487 (10th Cir 1995).
120 See id at 1488-89 (affirming the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy court's
finding of dischargeability); Jones, 9 F3d at 880 (affirming the district court's reversal of
the bankruptcy court's finding of dischargeability).
121 Jones, 9 F3d at 880-81.
122 Id at 882.
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court interpreted this language to limit a dischargeability in-
quiry to the relationship between the debt and the custody pro-
ceeding, consequently forbidding an inquiry into the nature of
the custody proceeding itself.123 These cases therefore imply that
bankruptcy courts cannot discharge debts related to custody dis-
putes. That is, they suggest both that bankruptcy courts must
find that costs in a child custody dispute constitute support, and
that the unusual circumstances language refers to procedural
irregularities.
D. The Circuits Remain Split as to Whether Exceptions to
Dischargeability Pose Questions of Fact or of Law
The attempt to reconcile the Eighth Circuit's decision with
the majority preference for dischargeability does not resolve the
underlying tension between the approaches that treat the ques-
tion as a matter of law and those that consider it one of fact. The
Eighth Circuit's position remains in conflict with the reasoning
and position taken by the Tenth Circuit in Jones and by the
Eleventh Circuit in Strickland, even if reconcilable with the ma-
jority position through any one or all of the three arguments
above. In both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the question of
whether a debt fits into the Section 523(a)(5) exception from dis-
charge "is a matter of federal law" subject to de novo review. In
the Eighth Circuit, the question of whether a debt fits into the
Section 523(a)(5) is a question of fact for the bankruptcy court
and is reviewed for clear error."' Bankruptcy courts must under-
take an independent and fact-intensive inquiry into whether the
underlying proceedings were actually necessary for the support
of the child.2
The Tenth Circuit twice reversed a lower court's discharge of
costs related to child custody proceedings. 7 In Jones, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the district court in reversing the bankruptcy
123 Miller, 55 F3d at 1489 ("The analysis [in Jones) focused entirely upon whether the
debt was in the nature of support. We held that it would be inappropriate to require a
bankruptcy court to determine the purpose of the custody action and that 'in all custody
actions, the court's ultimate goal is the welfare of the child.'").
124 Strickland, 90 F3d at 446. See also Miller, 55 F3d at 1489; Jones, 9 F3d at 880.
125 Adams, 963 F2d at 200 ("This is a question of fact to be decided by the bankruptcy
court.").
126 Id at 200-01. See also Part I B 2.
127 See Miller, 55 F3d at 1488; Jones, 9 F3d at 879. The cases that reached the court of
appeals from the Second and Fifth Circuits, in contrast, were upheld rather than re-
versed. See Part II C.
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court's finding that attorney's fees and costs related to a custody
dispute were dischargeable.128 The bankruptcy court had rea-
soned that Section 523(a)(5) did not exempt a custody dispute, as
separate from a support dispute, from discharge. 19 In Miller, the
court reversed a substantially similar holding by another bank-
ruptcy court.2 ° The Tenth Circuit's analysis of the question as a
matter of law forced it to reach the question of whether bank-
ruptcy courts are bound to find that costs incurred in custody
and visitation actions are in the nature of support, while other
circuits merely determined that such costs are not dischargeable
when in the nature of support.31 It has consistently found that
such costs do constitute support.
The Eleventh Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit, analyzed the
dischargeability question as one of law. In Strickland, the court
rejected the bankruptcy court's determination that debts to a
former spouse in relation to child custody proceedings were dis-
chargeable, instead agreeing with the district court's determina-
tion that such debts are nondischargeable as a matter of law. 33
This holding is particularly illuminating because the decisions of
the bankruptcy court and the district court in Strickland mirror
the decisions in Adams procedurally: in both cases the bank-
ruptcy court found that costs did not constitute support and the
district court reversed. 34 In Adams, the Eighth Circuit upheld
the bankruptcy court's initial determination that the costs
awarded did not constitute support, and reversed the district
court's determination to the contrary.3 3 The Eleventh Circuit in
Strickland took the opposite approach and determined that so
long as the obligation can "legitimately be characterized as sup-
port," it is nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(5). 13 This de-
128 Jones, 9 F3d at 879.
129 This holding is a plain text reading of 11 USC § 523(a)(5), which states that only
debts "actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support" are dischargeable.
130 Miller, 55 F3d at 1488 (describing the bankruptcy court's holding as based on the
'plain language of 11 USC § 523(a)(5)").
131 Id at 1489-90 (holding that the bankruptcy court was bound by precedent to find
that those debts that relate directly to child custody proceedings are in the nature of
support).
132 Jones, 9 F3d at 882.
133 Strickland, 90 F3d at 445.
134 Both Strickland, 90 F3d at 445, and Adams, 963 F2d at 199, describe the bank-
ruptcy court's finding of dischargeability and the district court's reversal as a matter of
law.
135 Adams, 963 F2d at 199-200.
136 Strickland, 90 F3d at 447, quoting In re Harrell, 754 F2d at 906.
593]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
termination seems largely based on the concern that a more in-
tensive factual inquiry would necessarily "embroil federal courts
in domestic relations matters which should properly be reserved
to the state courts."37
As the contrast between the approaches of the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits and that of the Eighth Circuit demonstrates,
even if Adams can be reconciled with the holdings of the Second
and Fifth Circuits, courts still must choose a consistent standard
under which to review the question of the dischargeability of
debts from costs incurred in child custody actions.
III. DISCHARGEABILITY OF COSTS SHOULD BE DECIDED AS A
MATTER OF LAW
The dischargeability of costs awarded in child custody dis-
putes should be decided as a matter of law. The circuits have
framed the current split in terms of outcome: most courts have
decided that costs awarded in child custody disputes may be dis-
chargeable, while the Eighth Circuit alone presumes such costs
to be nondischargeable."' This framing misses the most impor-
tant divide between the circuits-those that see the issue as a
question of law and those that see the issue as a question of
fact."9 Making case-by-case determinations of whether costs con-
stitute support is beyond the institutional capacity of the bank-
ruptcy courts, and thus the question should be decided as a mat-
ter of law.
Unlike debts incurred in contractual relationships, from
which an honest but unfortunate debtor usually seeks relief, the
parent-child relationship is one of status and cannot be wiped
out by a "fresh start." Support of a child is a parent's continuing
obligation, and consequently persists even in bankruptcy.4 ° Such
continuing obligations are outside the usual realm of the bank-
ruptcy courts. The family courts, on the other hand, have great
expertise in evaluating what is necessary for the continuing obli-
gation of support.' Furthermore, the best interests of the child
137 Id, quoting In re Harrell, 754 F2d 902, 907 (11th Cir 1985).
138 See, for example, Bower, 1999 Bankr LEXIS 1877, *5-9 (characterizing the split as
between the Eighth Circuit's discharge of a fee award and the nondischargeability of such
fees in the majority of circuits, and finding the rationale that "child custody is necessarily
tied" to support persuasive).
139 See Part II D.
140 See 11 USC § 523(a)(5).
141 Jones, 9 F3d at 881.
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standard mandates that any award for costs in child custody dis-
putes constitutes support in the broad sense required by bank-
ruptcy law.'42 Deference to the grant of awards made by family
court judges, therefore, seems wise and would be consistent with
the "[c]ongressional policy .. that genuine support obligations
would not be discharged." 1
43
IV. AS A MATTER OF LAW, COSTS IN CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
SHOULD CONSTITUTE SUPPORT UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
The question of whether costs awarded in child custody ac-
tions constitute support should be decided as a matter of law,
and such costs should be considered support as a matter of law.
The discharge of custody proceeding debts is outside the "fresh
start" framework because of continuing status obligations be-
tween debtors and their children. Family courts have particular
expertise in deciding these questions, and exercise that expertise
when deciding whether to award costs under the best interests of
the child standard. Furthermore, this standard works to ensure
that such awards constitute support as it is broadly construed in
bankruptcy law.
This Part develops the above argument in further detail and
suggests that not only institutional capacity and congressional
policy, but also broader federalism concerns weigh in favor of
deference to state court awards for fees and costs.
A. Institutional Capacity and Congressional Policy Weigh
Against Discharge of Debts from Costs Incurred in Child
Custody Actions
The congressional policy against the discharge of genuine
support obligations in bankruptcy, together with the institu-
tional incapacity of the bankruptcy courts to analyze these ques-
tions, weigh in favor of construing costs awarded in child custody
actions as support as a matter of law. Such a rule would require
142 See Shine v Shine, 802 F2d 583, 588 (1st Cir 1986). See also notes 26-27 and ac-
companying text.
143 See Shine, 802 F2d at 588. Compare family court awards to the Bankruptcy Code's
deference to state law in specifying property exempted from the bankruptcy estate. 11
USC § 522(b)(2)(A)(2000) (allowing the debtor to exempt from the bankruptcy estate any
property exempt under state law, even if the property would not be exempt under federal
law).
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bankruptcy courts to defer to state court awards for costs (and
the corresponding distribution of costs) in child custody actions.
1. Congressional policy.
Congress has long maintained a policy that genuine support
obligations not be discharged in bankruptcy.4 4 Since 1903, the
Bankruptcy Code has included an exception to discharge for ali-
mony, maintenance, and support payments.45 When the section
embodying this policy was revised in 1978, the broad exception
for alimony, maintenance, and support remained.4 ' The Con-
gressional Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States' proposal for this amendment left the exception intact, and
in fact proposed to "broaden the bankruptcy law's protection of
the families of the bankrupt spouse in accordance with changing
times.' 47 In 1984, another amendment widened the scope of Sec-
tion 523(a)(5) to include children born outside of marriage, by
extending the exception to spousal or child support debts in con-
nection with any order by a court of record.4 4 As the First Circuit
concluded in Shine v Shine, 9 legislative history supports a find-
ing that congressional policy is consistent with excluding genuine
support obligations from discharge in bankruptcy."0
2. Institutional capacity and costs awarded as support.
The family court's ultimate goal in custody proceedings is to
decide what is necessary to support the welfare and best inter-
ests of the child, a determination which coincides both with sup-
port obligations under Section 523(a)(5) and the best interest of
the child standard of review. Because family courts make deci-
144 Shine v Shine, 802 F2d 583, 586-88 (1st Cir 1986) (reviewing the history of the
congressional policy that support obligations not be discharged in bankruptcy and con-
cluding that the 1978 Amendment did not alter that policy).
145 Act of Feb 5, 1903, 5, 23 Stat 797, 798 (repealed 1978). See Shine, 802 F2d at 586
(describing the incorporation of the common law exception to discharge for obligations of
alimony, maintenance, and support into Section 17 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act).
146 See Alexander, 43 Cath U L Rev at 357 (cited in note 17) (noting that Section
523(a)(5) of the current Bankruptcy Code is "the gender-neutral replacement for section
17(a)(7) of the 1898 Act" amended to comply with equal protection requirements).
147 See Shine, 802 F2d at 586-87, citing Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws, HR Rep No 93-137, 93d Cong, 1st Sess (1973).
148 11 USC § 523(a)(5). See also David N. Ravin and Kenneth A. Rosen, The Dis-
chargeability in Bankruptcy of Alimony, Maintenance and Support Obligations, 60 Am
Bankr L J 1, 6-7 (1986) (detailing the history of Section 523(a)(5)).
149 802 F2d 583 (1st Cir 1986).
150 Id at 586-88.
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sions about whether to award fees and costs based on what they
determine to be in the best interest of the child, by definition
they can only award costs if such awards serve the child's best
interests. Bankruptcy courts should, therefore, interpret the ex-
istence of a family court award as proof that the award consti-
tutes support. The reasoning outlined in Jones and Ramirez sup-
ports the deference shown by the Fifth Circuit to state court de-
terminations of the child's welfare. 151
In Jones, the Tenth Circuit stated that bankruptcy courts
are ill-equipped to determine whether the subjective purpose of a
particular custody action matches the objective purpose of cus-
tody actions generally.' Because custody actions focus on find-
ing the best home for the child, they are necessarily "held for the
child's benefit and support."'53 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
"to require the [bankruptcy] court to determine the purpose of
the custody action could require extensive hearings and fact-
findings into the parties' subjective motivations which is more
appropriate to the state court than a bankruptcy court."154 The
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois explicitly
followed Jones, and rejected Adams, in Ramirez."5 The court in
Ramirez cited with approval the Tenth Circuit's rejection of the
factual inquiry required by the Eighth Circuit because "[the
Eighth Circuit's] approach ignores that the fundamental issue in
every child custody proceeding is the best interests of the
child.""6
The goal of custody proceedings in state courts is to serve the
best interests of the child.'57 The purpose of the bankruptcy court,
1'1 See Jones, 9 F3d at 881-82 (arguing that deference is due to awards made in child
custody proceedings because the award of fees in those actions are made with the goal of
promoting the welfare of the child); Ramirez, 2000 Bankr LEXIS 2019, *14-15 (arguing
that a lack of deference to awards for fees made by family courts ignores the fundamental
premise that all decisions made by courts in child custody actions are made to further the
best interests of the child).
152 Jones, 9 F3d at 881.
163 Id at 882.
154 Id at 881.
155 Ramirez, 2000 Bankr LEXIS 2019, *14-15 ("This Court agrees with the Tenth
Circuit that the best interest of the child is necessarily the key issue in all custody ac-
tions, and that fees incurred in custody actions should be presumed to be in the nature of
support unless exceptional circumstances exist. The Eight [sic] Circuit's approach ignores
that the fundamental issue in every child custody proceeding is the best interests of the
child.").
156 Id.
157 Jones, 9 F3d at 881 ("In our view, in all custody actions, the court's ultimate goal is
the welfare of the child.').
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on the other hand, is to give the debtor a fresh start.' Bank-
ruptcy courts, therefore, emphasize the debtor's interests over a
child's interests.1 9 Furthermore, because they do not have the
advantage of witness testimony, they may not know all of the
facts needed to make an informed determination about the
child's welfare. 6 ° The relative institutional capacities of state and
bankruptcy courts thus weigh in favor of allowing state family
courts to evaluate what distribution of costs serves the best in-
terests of a child.
6 1
B. Discharge Interferes with the Family Court's Determination
of a Child's Welfare And Support
Bankruptcy courts should not discharge debts from custody
and visitation actions because custody actions focus on the child's
welfare.'62 The purpose of custody hearings is in fact to provide
for the welfare and support of the child.' Family courts award
costs in custody hearings based on the best interests of the child
standard, which is designed to promote the child's welfare.6 Be-
cause the congressional policy behind Section 523(a)(5) is that no
genuine support obligation should be discharged in bank-
ruptcy,' allowing bankruptcy courts to reevaluate the decision
158 Local Loan Co v Hunt, 292 US 234, 244 (1934).
159 See Alyson F. Finkelstein, A Thg of War: State Divorce Courts Versus Federal
Bankruptcy Courts Regarding Debts Resulting from Divorce, 18 Bankr Dev J 169, 194
(2001) ("Bankruptcy courts are not the proper forums within which to address family law
issues.... Bankruptcy courts tend to place a larger emphasis on the debtor's interests
and may not know all of the facts.").
160 See id.
161 In Peters v Hennenhoeffer, 133 BR 291, 296 n 5 (Bankr S D NY 1991), the court
made a point of deferring to the state court's decision regarding the child's well-being,
because the Second Circuit is not in the "business of modifying matrimonial decrees es-
tablished by state courts" through the bankruptcy laws.
162 Jones, 9 F3d at 881 ("[I]n all custody actions, the court's ultimate goal is the wel-
fare of the child.").
163 See Hudson, 107 F3d at 357 ("[Tlhe ultimate purpose of such a proceeding is to
provide support for the child."); Dvorak, 986 F2d at 941 ("That hearing was clearly for...
[the child's] benefit and support, as the purpose of the hearing was to determine who
could provide the best home for her."); Jones, 9 F3d at 881 ("In our view, in all custody
actions, the court's ultimate goal is the welfare of the child."); Ramirez, 2000 Bankr
LEXIS 2019, *14-15; Bower, 1999 Bankr LEXIS 1877, *9 ("The issue of child custody is
necessarily tied to the issue of a child's support.").
164 Consider Hudson, 107 F3d at 357 ("Because the ultimate purpose of such a pro-
ceeding is to provide support for the child, the attorney fees incurred inure to her benefit
and support, and therefore fall under the exception to dischargeability set out in §
523(a)(5).").
165 See Shine, 802 F2d at 586-88 (reviewing the legislative history to the 1978
Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act and concluding that "[clongressional policy... [was]
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of the family court would increase the probability that genuine
support obligations are discharged.'66
Awards for attorney's fees are used in the child custody con-
text to ensure that the child's best interests are adequately rep-
resented.67 Fees incurred in bringing a custody action do not
benefit a child, spouse, or former spouse of the debtor as directly
as they benefit the attorney, psychologist, or guardian ad litem,
for example. Even so, these fees are necessary to the support of
the child in that determining the child's best interests in custody
proceedings requires that each party's interest be adequately
represented.'68 Those fees and costs are thus in the nature of
support.
69
This treatment of costs in custody hearings is in line with
the treatment in bankruptcy of costs related to divorce. Just as
costs constitute support when awarded in child custody proceed-
ings undertaken for the welfare of the child, they are also consid-
ered support when granted to parties in divorce "who would oth-
erwise not be able to litigate."17 That is, the courts distinguish
between those fees that constitute support and those that do not
based on whether they view the costs to be necessary to the goal
of support. 17' This reasoning explicitly underlies the Second Cir-
to ensure that genuine support obligations would not be discharged").
166 See Jones, 9 F3d at 882 ("Therefore, in order that genuine support obligations are
not improperly discharged, we hold that the term 'support' encompasses the issue of cus-
tody absent unusual circumstances not present here."); Sinton v Blaemire, 229 BR 665,
668-69 (Bankr D Md 1999) ("The clear purpose of the court in appointing an attorney for
the children is to act in the best interests of the attorney's wards .... Public policy de-
mands a [ I broader reading of what is meant by support for a minor child in 11 USC §
523(a)(5).").
167 See, for example, Ramirez, 2000 Bankr LEXIS 2019, *21-23 (noting that the re-
moval of debtor's child from her care was in the child's best interests and ordering debtor
to pay for former spouse's attorney's fees).
168 See Peters, 133 BR at 295 ("In any matrimonial action, whether it concerns the
divorce, maintenance, support, custody, or post-decree proceedings implicating any of the
foregoing, it is essential that each party be able to adequately represent its interests.").
169 See Pauley v Spong, 661 F2d 6, 9 (2d Cir 1981) ("An award of attorney's fees may
be essential to... [the] ability to sue or to defend ... and thus a necessary under the law.
... [D]ischargeability must be determined by the substance of the liability rather than its
form.").
170 Jeffry H. Gallet and Bonnie R. Cohen-Gallet, The Federalization of Family Law:
Avoiding the Discharge of Legal Fees in Bankruptcy, 16 J Am Acad Matrimonial Law 165,
166 (1999) (discussing the support of dependents exemption to the discharge of legal fees).
See also Peters, 133 BR at 295-96 (describing the "general agreement" of courts that obli-
gations in the nature of support "may include the duty to pay attorney's fess incurred by
the former spouse in connection with a divorce proceeding" so that each party's interests
can be adequately represented).
171 Gallet and Cohen-Gallet, 16 J Am Acad Matrimonial Law at 166 (cited in note
170).
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cuit's approach in Peters, and lurks in the background of other
decisions as well.'
72
The Second Circuit in Peters cited its earlier decision in
Pauley v Spong'7 in ruling that debts for costs incurred in child
custody actions are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.'14 The court
in Spong reasoned that, unless costs imposed by family courts
constitute support, the ability of parties to litigate or to defend
their rights in the domestic relations context would be compro-
mised.7 1 Spong demonstrates a particular function of awards for
costs in the child custody context: family court judges often
award fees against a party who is interfering with the rights of
another, or against a party who is acting to the child's detriment,
or based on ability to pay."' While Spong dealt with divorce, the
district judge in Peters extended its reasoning to the child cus-
tody context in ordering the debtor to pay half of the attorney's
fees and costs owed for representation of the debtor's son.'7 7 The
judge's determination reflected his judgment that the award was
necessary because it was in the child's best interests.'
Discharging debts incurred in child custody actions creates
an incentive problem. If bankruptcy courts can discharge these
debts, parents would have less incentive to enforce their rights
and the rights of their children under custody agreements, or to
seek to modify these agreements when they no longer serve the
best interests of the child.' 9 Judges award fees to parents in cus-
172 Compare Peters, 964 F2d at 167, quoting Spong, 661 F2d at 9 ("An award of attor-
ney's fees may be essential to... [the] ability to sue or defend a [support] action and thus
a necessary under the law.... [D]ischargeability must be determined by the substance of
the liability rather than its form."), with Hudson, 107 F3d at 357 (finding that the attor-
ney who represented a child's parent provided "a necessary service for the child").
173 661 F2d 6 (2d Cir 1981).
174 Peters, 964 F2d at 167 (relying on Spong for the proposition that an award of at-
torney's fees is necessary to the underlying action).
175 Spong, 661 F2d at 9 (reasoning that without the prospect of family court judges
awarding costs to the other party, many litigants would be unable to sue or to defend
their rights).
176 See, for example, Ramirez, 2000 Bankr LEXIS 2019, *21-23 (noting that the re-
moval of debtor's child from her care was in the child's best interests and ordering debtor
to pay for former spouse's attorney's fees). See also Strickland, 90 F3d at 445-47 (finding
state court's order that debtor pay part of his former wife's attorneys fees and costs based
on ability to pay to be debt in the nature of support).
177 Peters, 133 BR at 293.
178 Id at 296 ("The protection of the child's interests in court by the guardian ad litem
constitutes a measure of support for the child whose value to the child cannot be dimin-
ished. Indeed, it is in the child's best interests to have custody matters fully and fairly
litigated. Insuring this is done is part of the parents' duty to support the child.").
179 Consider id at 295-96 (reasoning that because both parties in domestic relations
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tody disputes when doing so serves the best interests of the
child.18 ° For example, if a mother is improperly interfering with
her ex-husband's custody rights, a judge might make an award of
his fees in bringing an action to enforce those rights because en-
forcing them serves the best interests of the child.' Such an
award promotes the child's welfare by reallocating the cost of the
enforcement action to the parent whose actions make enforce-
ment necessary.' Courts use this mechanism to encourage par-
ents to bring actions that determine what custody arrangement
would serve the child's best interests. When bankruptcy courts
disrupt the balance of costs determined by the family court to
serve the best interests of the child, they undermine this mecha-
nism and discharge genuine support obligations in contravention
of congressional policy.
C. Federalism and the Overlapping Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy
Courts and State Family Courts
The determination of whether awards of costs in child cus-
tody actions are "in the nature of support" is a matter of federal
bankruptcy law." The concurrent jurisdiction of bankruptcy and
state family courts over issues of alimony, maintenance, and
support creates the potential for disagreement between the two
courts.' When federal law and state family law conflict, two
types of arguments have been used to support the proposition
that federal law should not interfere with the province of the
family courts: policy-based arguments and arguments based on
actions such as divorce, maintenance, support, or custody must be able to represent their
own interests, awards of attorney's and guardian ad litem fees are support obligations
under federal bankruptcy law).
180 See id at 296 (characterizing guardian ad litem fees as being incurred in the child's
best interests).
181 See, for example, Ramirez, 2000 LEXIS Bankr 2019, *21-23 (ordering debtor to pay
her former spouse's attorney's fees in bringing an action to remove debtor's child from her
care because removal was in the child's best interests).
182 See id.
183 Finkelstein, 18 Bankr Dev J at 180 (cited in note 159) ('The source of federal
courts' control can be found in the language of... section [523(a)(5)], which makes ali-
mony, maintenance, and support debt nondischargeable only if 'such liability is actually
in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.'"). See Jones, 9 F3d at 880 (finding
that state law can "provide guidance as to whether a debt is to be considered in the 'na-
ture of support,'" but cannot be determinative) (citations omitted).
184 Finkelstein, 18 Bankr Dev J at 178-79 (cited in note 159). See Aldrich v Imbrogno,
34 BR 776, 779-80 (BAP 9th Cir 1983) (noting that the bankruptcy court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the state court as to whether debts arising out of a divorce are excepted
from discharge).
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the tradition of "exclusive localism."'85 Policy arguments,'86 such
as the institutional capacity argument, have been addressed ear-
lier in this Comment."' More commonly, the unique status of
family law in the federal system is put forward to argue for def-
erence to state courts. In the context of deciding whether costs
awarded in child custody disputes should be dischargeable as a
matter of law, the exclusive localism of family law suggests that
bankruptcy courts should not be in the business of overturning
the judgments of family courts.
1. Family law and exclusive localism in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy courts should not discharge debts for costs in-
curred in custody and visitation proceedings because doing so
interferes with the proper province of the state courts. As the
Supreme Court pointed out in Ex parte Burrus,'88 "there is no
federal law of domestic relations, the whole subject of which be-
longs to the laws of the States."'89 Bankruptcy courts interfere
with the state courts' jurisdiction over family law when they void
the settlements by which state courts have resolved domestic
controversies. 90
The interference with family law judgments differs from in-
terference by bankruptcy courts in other areas controlled by
state law--consumer purchases and home loans, for example-
both for the practical reasons of institutional capacity and be-
cause family law has a special place in the federal scheme. 9'
Family law is the preeminent example of an area of law regu-
lated exclusively by the states."' More specifically, in the context
of the Bankruptcy Code, obligations between husband and wife
185 Hasday, 45 UCLA L Rev at 1298 (cited in note 15) (summarizing the kinds of ar-
guments made for a special status of exclusive localism in family law).
186 Id ("[Clourts and commentators... do not explain the singular status of family law
primarily in terms of public policy or institutional design.").
187 See Part IV A-B.
188 136 US 586 (1980)
189 Id at 593-94 (citations omitted).
190 See Finkelstein, 18 Bankr Dev J at 194-95 (cited in note 159) (arguing that
"[b]ankruptcy courts are not the proper forums within which to address family law is-
sues" and thus "federal courts are violating basic principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel by addressing the same issues and claims that the state divorce courts already
addressed").
191 Burrus, 136 US at 593-94.
192 See Hasday, 45 UCLA L Rev at 1302-04 (cited in note 15) (arguing that the Court's
reliance on tradition to single out family law as an area of law "off-limits to the national
government" is misplaced).
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and between parent and child traditionally were considered du-
ties and not debts, and hence were not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy.193 Thus, even before Congress enacted Section 523(a)(5)
and its predecessors, these obligations were not discharged in
bankruptcy under common law; the passage of Section 523(a)(5)
merely codified that common law exception.'
The common law exception to the discharge of family obliga-
tions is important to the constitutional dimensions of bank-
ruptcy. The Constitution explicitly grants authority to Congress
to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States."'9' If family obligations were not
seen by the Framers as within the "subject" of bankruptcy, then
Congress may have no power to discharge those debts. 196 This
reasoning is similar to that found in recent Supreme Court cases
dealing with federalism in the Commerce Clause context. In
United States v Lopez, 97 the Court emphasized the traditional
local nature of family law, "including marriage, divorce, and
child custody," to impose limits on legislation under the Com-
merce Clause.'99 Like family law, the Court reasoned, criminal
law enforcement is an area of law reserved to the states, and
thus Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce
Clause in regulating mere possession of a firearm near a
school.' 99 If family obligations were traditionally beyond the
reach of the bankruptcy court, and family law is an area of regu-
lation reserved to the states, then family law may be the outer
boundary of Congress's bankruptcy power.
193 See Shine, 802 F2d at 586 (relying on and describing the common law exception to
discharge for alimony, maintenance, and support in interpreting Section 523(a)(5)). See
also Alexander, 43 Cath U L Rev at 354-57 (cited in note 17) (describing the common law
duty of a man to care for his wife and children as the common law basis for the dis-
chargeability exception formally enacted into the bankruptcy code in 1903).
194 Alexander, 43 Cath U L Rev at 356-57 (cited in note 17) (describing the enactment
of Section 523(a)(5), the gender-neutral replacement for earlier provisions which re-
enacted the common law duty of a man to care for his wife and children after divorce). See
also Spong, 661 F2d at 7-8 (relying on the common law obligation of a husband to support
his wife to interpret Section 523(a)(5)).
195 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 4.
196 The Supreme Court found the common law exception to discharge for support
obligations in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act in Audubon v Shufeldt, 181 US 575 (1901).
197 514 US 549 (1995) (holding that Congress could not regulate possession of firearms
in school zones under its commerce power).
198 Id at 564 (declaring that the commerce power does not extend to family law).
199 Id (arguing that if the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 is upheld, "it is difficult
to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforce-
ment or education where States historically have been sovereign").
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2. Exclusive localism and Spong.
The exclusive localism of family law has factored explicitly
into the courts' analysis when deciding whether or not to dis-
charge debts for costs awarded in child custody disputes. Bank-
ruptcy courts do not decide questions of alimony, maintenance,
and support "in a vacuum."2 °° In Spong, the Second Circuit justi-
fied its decision to overturn the bankruptcy court's decision to
discharge a family court award by pointing to Congress's aware-
ness of the lack of federal jurisdiction over family law when it
enacted Section 523(a)(5)."' The court reasoned that Congress
intended to formulate "the bankruptcy law of alimony and sup-
port" with "reference to the reasoning of the well-established law
of the States."2 2 The court in Spong thus ruled that an award of
attorney's fees made by the state in connection with the debtor's
divorce proceedings was not dischargeable, despite the bank-
ruptcy court's determination to the contrary.0 3
The Second Circuit's deference to the determination by the
family court in Spong provides a sound solution to the potential
conflict between state family courts and bankruptcy courts. In
recognizing the special status of family law within the federal
system, deference to the family court's determination effectively
administers the congressional policy against the discharge of
genuine support obligations while avoiding potential constitu-
tional conflicts.2 4
200 Spong, 661 F2d at 9.
201 Id ("As Congress undoubtedly was aware, United States courts have no jurisdiction
over divorce or alimony allowances."), citing Boddie v Connecticut, 401 US 371, 389 (1971)
(Black dissenting) and De La Rama v De La Rama, 201 US 303, 307 (1906).
202 Spong, 661 F2d at 9.
203 Id at 7-8.
204 The Court has demonstrated its reluctance to construe federal law to conflict with
state family law absent clear congressional intent to preempt state law. In Rose v Rose,
481 US 619 (1987), the Court declined to insulate veterans' benefits from "the traditional
authority of state courts over the issue of child support," based in part on state courts'
"unparalleled familiarity with local economic factors affecting [ I parents and children." Id
at 628. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor explicitly analogized to the potential conflict
between support obligations and bankruptcy law, noting that the Court has always con-
sidered support obligations to be outside the scope of bankruptcy law. Id at 637-38
(O'Connor concurring).
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D. Genuine Support Obligations Cannot Be Discharged under
the Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(5) prohibits the discharge of genuine support
obligations in bankruptcy. When state family courts resolve child
custody disputes, they are deciding what constitutes support be-
cause they resolve disputes under the best interests of the child
standard. °5 These courts award costs in such actions only when
the award itself serves those interests. Bankruptcy courts should
recognize the mere existence of the award as proof that these
awards are support. Once family courts determine that such an
award is in a child's best interests, that award is support, and
the bankruptcy court's discharge of the debt discharges a genu-
ine support obligation in contravention of congressional policy, in
the face of institutional incapacity, and without regard for consti-
tutional concerns.
CONCLUSION
Courts generally construe exceptions to discharge under Sec-
tion 523 narrowly, to ensure a debtor's opportunity for a fresh
start.0 6 This rule of narrow construction, however, does not work
absolutely. Rather, it limits discharge to those situations in
which the creditor's interests in the continuing obligation out-
weigh the debtor's interest in a fresh start as a matter of con-
gressional policy.0 7 Children of debtors have an interest in con-
tinuing relationships with their debtor parents, independent of
the bankruptcy proceedings. To the extent that support obliga-
tions are disputed in these proceedings, Congress has concluded
that the children's interests outweigh those of their parents.0 8
Thus, the courts have construed support broadly in the context of
Section 523(a)(5) to include "all genuine support obligations."2 9
The question then becomes whether costs from custody and
visitation proceedings are "genuine support obligations" and
which court should make that determination. The Eighth Circuit
found debts from costs incurred in child custody proceedings to
be dischargeable in bankruptcy.2"' While this position appears on
205 Jones, 9 F3d at 882.
206 Gleason v Thaw, 236 US 558, 562 (1915).
207 Grogan v Garner, 498 US 279, 287 (1991).
208 See 11 USC § 523(a)(5).
209 Shine, 802 F2d at 588.
210 Adams, 963 F2d at 201.
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its face to contradict that of the majority of circuits, which have
found such costs to be nondischargeable, this Comment demon-
strates that the Eighth Circuit's holding can be partially recon-
ciled with the positions of the Second and Fifth Circuits. The di-
vergence of the Eighth Circuit may be attributable to the un-
usual circumstances exception, the purpose of the underlying
custody dispute, or deference to the factual findings of the bank-
ruptcy court.21' The Tenth and the Eleventh Circuits, in contrast,
have found that costs connected to custody proceedings generally
constitute support, and thus are nondischargeable as a matter of
law.212 This determination that the question should be resolved
as a matter of law reflects the unique nature of child custody
hearings in the bankruptcy context.
Not only should the question of whether costs awarded in
child custody disputes constitute support be decided as a matter
of law, such costs should be deemed support as a matter of law.
As this Comment argues, congressional policy and relative insti-
tutional capacity favor this position. Because custody actions are
inseparable from a child's welfare and support, and because costs
are necessary to enable parties to bring such actions, these costs
are always genuine support obligations. This position is superior
to allowing individual factual determinations by the bankruptcy
courts, because the state family court-with its focus on the
child's welfare-is better suited to implement the congressional
policy that all genuine support obligations be nondischargeable
in bankruptcy. Furthermore, a determination that awards of
such costs are nondischargeable reflects the proper division be-
tween state and national authorities in our federalist system.
211 See Part II.
212 See Strickland, 90 F3d at 446; Miller, 55 F3d at 1489; Jones, 9 F3d at 880.
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